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Abstract 
 
We explore a newly available dataset on quality of growth to investigate the effect of 
institutions on growth quality in 93 developing countries for the period 1990 to 2011. Quality 
of institutions is measured in term of political risk. The empirical evidence is based on: (i) 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and (ii) cross-sectional 
and panel data structures. In order to avail room for more policy implications, the dataset is 
further disaggregated into income levels, namely: Lower middle income (LMIC), low income 
(LI) and upper middle income (UMIC). Three main findings are established. First, institutions 
are positively related to the quality of growth. Second, institutions have significantly 
contributed to growth quality in increasing order during the following time intervals: 2005-
2011, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. Third, the positive nexus between institutions and growth 
quality is fundamentally driven by LMIC. Policy implications are discussed.  
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JEL Classification: O40, O55, I10,  
 
1. Introduction 
 Since the fundamental empirical works of Mauro (1995), and Keffer and Knack 
(1995), a substantial empirical literature has been devoted to the importance of institutions in 
economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Baland et al., 2010; Musila and Sigué, 2010; 
Kodila-Tedika, 2012; Anyanwu  and  Erhijakpor, 2014;  Efobi, 2015). However, today with 
the transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), the debate is gradually shifting from growth to ‘quality of growth’ (Asongu, 
2015a; Asongu and Gupta, 2015). This is typically consistent with the theoretical and 
empirically underpinnings of Stewart and Streeten (1971) and Bhagwatti (1988) who 
established that economic growth acceleration is not enough to ensure socio-economic 
development. Along the same stream of literature, Ravallion (2001), Kakwani and Pernia 
(2000), Kakwani et al. (2004), Duclos (2009), have articulated the absolute and relative 
relevance of pro-poor growth.  On the other hand, Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) and 
Milanovic (2005), inter alia, have insisted on: (i) the role of inequality in the poverty growth 
relations, (ii) the notions of pro-poor growth
1
 and (iii) burgeoning impoverishing or 
immiserizing growth.  
 Among others, Lopez and Serven (2004), Lopez (2005) and  Klasen (2005), have 
articulated that the debate has been exclusively focused on monetary aspects. Hence, many 
dimensions have been neglected. More recently, another concept has been evolving to 
overshadow the conception of pro-poor growth: inclusive growth
2
. With respect to Rauniyar 
and Kanbur (2010), inclusive growth is one characterised with declining inequality. Inclusive 
growth is also considered as inter alia: (i) pro-poor amelioration in social opportunities (Ali 
and Son, 2007) and (ii) equal access of opportunities (Ali and Zhuang, 2007).  
The advantage of this inclusive development indicator is that it uses an inclusive 
growth measure that is better than those proposed by Ianchovichina and Gable (2012) and 
Anand et al. (2013). In essence, the quality of growth index (QGI) of Mlachila et al. (2014) 
has integrated social dimensions into the intrinsic measurement of growth. The QGI conceives 
‘inclusive growth’ as ‘pro-poor growth’ that is high, durable and socially-friendly. Therefore, 
some of the crucial dimensions essential for ‘growth quality’ entail: increasing productivity, 
stability, strength, better standards of living and reduction of poverty. To the best of our 
knowledge, this QGI has been employed by two studies, namely: Asongu and Gupta (2015) 
and Asongu (2015a). The latter has assessed the conditional effects of welfare spending on 
                                                          
1
More insights can be found in inter alia: World Bank (2001), Klasen (2002, 2008) and Kakwani and Son 
(2008).  
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Rauniyar and Kanbur (2010) have provided a survey of the literature on uses of inclusive growth. 
quality of growth while the former study has used the new measurement to extend the trust-
growth nexus to a ‘trust’-‘quality of growth’ relationship.  In the same vein, we complement 
this stream of literature by extending the institutions-growth nexus literature (highlighted in 
the first paragraph) to the ‘institutions’-‘quality of growth’ relationship. Institutions within the 
framework of this study are in terms of political risks. In what follows, we devote space to 
substantiating the contemporary relevance of political risk in developing countries.  
The mid-June 2015 report on Global Peace estimates that a substantial portion of 
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is spent on costs related to political instability and 
violent activities (Anderson, 2015). Accordingly, in 2014, about 14.3 trillion USD (or 13.4% 
of Global GDP) was spent to mitigate, inter alia: crimes, violence and political instability. 
The underlying cost is equivalent to the total GDP of Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. The report also projects political instability in the coming years. In 
essence, most of the instability is in developing countries and corresponding poverty 
externalities have been quite significant given that the year 2014 has recorded the largest 
number of internally displaced persons since World War 2 (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 
2015a). Political risk has been documented to represent a substantial challenge to lifting 
Africa from poverty (Amavilah, 2015). The relevance of political risk in this context is even 
more interesting because the April 2015 World Bank report on MDGs has shown that poverty 
has not been declining in some developing countries (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2015b), 
especially those affected by recurrent political instability.  
Since the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, political risk has been seriously deteriorating 
the quality of institutions in developing countries. Recent evidence can be stylized in ten main 
points. The first-two points are in accordance with Efobi et al. (2015), the third to the ninth 
are in line with Asongu et al. (2015) and Asongu  and  Nwachukwu (2015), whereas the tenth 
point is consistent with McDowell (2015). First, the political situation in Yemen has been 
deteriorating with proxy wars currently being fought by Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively in 
favor of rebels and the government. The ongoing political conflict has erupted partly because 
of the failure by the government of Yemen to respect all the terms of its socio-political 
contract with the Yemenis after the ouster of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Second, the 
Syrian conflict has given birth to a powerful Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that is 
currently destabilising the political fundamentals and concept of ‘nation state’ in North Africa 
and the Middle East. Some of ISIL’s geopolitical externalities have not been limited 
exclusively to developing countries but also extended to developed nations, with recent 
examples including, inter alia, the: January 2015 ‘Charlie Hebdo’ attacks in Paris-France, 
foiled February 2015 attacks in Australia,  December 2014 hostage crisis in Sydney-Australia, 
and foiled January 2015 attacks in Verviers-Belgium. However, the scope of this line of 
inquiry is limited to developing countries because the quality of growth data provided by 
Mlachila et al. (2014) is only available for developing countries.  
Third, in the post-Gaddafi era, the political situation in Libya has deteriorated into that 
of a failed State which is characterised by substantial anarchy and societal breakdown. In 
essence, there are two rival governments and a plethora of rebel factions desperately fighting 
to dictate the law of the land. Fourth, in Kenya, the 2015 Garissa university and Westgate 
shopping mall killings have shown that the Somali Al-Quaeda affiliated Al-Shabab can still 
inflict considerable challenges to political stability in the sub-region. Fifth, in Tunisia, after 
the political landscape that has been characterised by post-‘Arab Spring’ assassinations, the 
new democratically elected government is presently being confronted with  waves of threats 
from Islamic fundamentalists, namely, the: Sousse and Bardo National Museum attacks 
respectively in June and March 2015. Sixth, the Boko Haram of Nigeria is currently extending 
its distortion of political stability to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. 
Seventh, in Burundi, a recent decision by President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for another 
mandate has cast a shadow of political violence/instability across the country. Eight, the 
political turmoil in South Sudan which began in 2013 has resulted in thousands of death and 
also displaced hundreds of thousands of South-Sudanese to neighbouring countries. Ninth, the 
current political climate in the Central African Republic is not different from past 
experiences, namely: (i) a series of aborted coup d’états between 1996 and 2003 and (ii) the 
Bush war fought between 2004 and 2007. Tenth, the current Ukrainian crisis represents a 
proxy battle front between Russia and the West (McDowell, 2015) and could exert significant 
externalities in other developing countries, like ongoing efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis.  
It is important to note that prior to the 2011 Arab Spring, the nine cases of political 
crisis that had led to total societal breakdown recorded in contemporary development 
literature were in developing countries, namely: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Iraq, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire/Congo (Asongu, 2014a). Some notable examples 
from the narrative include: (i) Nigeria’s marred political transitions in 2008 and 2011; (ii) 
2007/2008 post-election crisis in Kenya; and (iii) the protracted politico-economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe. Consistent with Asongu (2014a, p. 1569), the fundamental rule of the political 
game has been political strife, with examples like: Angola (1975-2002); Chad (2005-2010); 
Liberia (1999-2003); Burundi (1993-2005); Côte d’Ivoire (with a resurrected crisis in 2011 
after the 1999 coup d’état and 2002-2007 civil war); Somalia and Sudan (with carnages in 
Durfur); the Congo Democratic Republic  and Sierra Leone (1991-2002).  
 The above evidence of contemporary political risks does not augur well with the 
objectives of mitigating poverty and enhancing inclusive growth in the post-2015 
development agenda. We investigate 93 developing countries with data from Mlachila et al. 
(2014) for the period 1990 to 2011. Quality of institutions is measured in term of political 
risk. The empirical evidence is based on: (i) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) and (ii) cross-sectional and panel data structures. In order to avail room 
for more policy implications, the dataset is further disaggregated into income levels, namely: 
Lower middle income (LMIC), low income (LI) and upper middle income (UMIC).  
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly articulates 
contemporary stakes and inclusive growth measurement in developing countries. The data and 
methodology are discussed in Section 3. Empirical results and discussion are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Contemporary stakes and inclusive growth measurement in developing countries 
 ‘Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 
1955). The April 2015 World Bank report on MDGs has shown that some developing regions 
(like sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)) have been witnessing increasing poverty levels 
(Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 2015), in spite of: (i) more than two decades of growth 
resurgence that started in the mid-1990s (Fosu, 2015, p. 44) and (ii) the sub-region hosting 
seven of the ten fastest growing economies in the world (Asongu and Gupta, 2015). 
According to the World Bank report, 45% of countries in the sub-region are off-track from 
attaining the MDG poverty target. Most of these countries in SSA have a low-income status.  
 In light of the above stylized facts, it is apparent that the growth experienced by low 
income countries has been marred by increasing poverty and inequality. This is consistent 
with empirical literature substantiating that ‘growth quality’ is relevant because the inequality 
elasticity of poverty is higher than the growth elasticity of poverty. This implies that the 
response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality. More concretely: “The 
study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of 
inequality” (Fosu, 2010a, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing 
function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the 
income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 1432); and “In general, high initial levels of 
inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality 
increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11).  The above 
conjectures have been verified both in African economies (Fosu, 2010c, 2010a) and broad 
panel of developing countries (Fosu, 2010b).  
 The interesting contemporary literature on inclusive growth has centred on inter alia: 
correlates of poverty (Anyanwu, 2013a, 2014a), gender inequality (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; 
Baliamoune-Lutz, & McGillivray, 2009; Elu, 2013; Anyanwu, 2013b, 2014b), reinventing 
foreign aid for inclusive and sustainable development (Asongu, 2015b), recent progress in 
finance for inclusive and sustainable development (Asongu and De Moor, 2015), debates 
about absolute pro-poor (Ravallion  and  Chen, 2003) and relative pro-poor (Dollar and 
Kraay, 2002) growth and measurements of inclusive growth (Anand et al., 2013; Mlachila et 
al., 2014). This last stream of the literature is closest to the present line of inquiry because we 
are exploring a new quality of growth database.  
 Whereas a plethora of indicators for measuring inclusive growth have been proposed 
in the literature, as far as we have reviewed, the most notable are from Anand et al. (2013) 
and Mlachila et al. (2014). The Anand et al. measurement has accounted for inequality by 
substantially drawing from a stream of current literature documenting the essence of inclusive 
growth in sustainable mitigation of poverty (Kraay, 2004; Berg et al., 2011ab).  Contrary to 
relative pro-poor growth (Dollar and Kraay, 2002), the authors have adopted the notion of 
absolute pro-poor growth that is consistent with Ravallion and Chen (2003). The former 
conception of pro-poor growth sustains that growth is inclusive provided that it mitigates 
inequality whereas according to the latter, inclusive growth is one that reduces poverty. With 
respect to Anand et al., the relative pro-poor growth concept would affect poor and rich 
households with sub-optimal externalities. Their understanding of inclusiveness and definition 
of inclusive growth embodies features like: employment transitions, market protection, equal 
opportunities and equity. In this light, their measurement of inclusive growth which includes, 
inter alia: increasing investment, equal employment opportunities and productivity.  
On the other hand, the measurement of inclusive development by Mlachila et al. 
(2014) has built on Anand et al. (2013) as well as a plethora of previous concepts, definitions 
and measurements of pro-poor growth, in order to provide a new indicator termed the Quality 
of Growth Index (QGI).  
In essence, the new index which also draws from the Commission on Growth and 
Development (2008) and Ianchovichina and Gable (2012), is based on a strand of the 
literature which sustains that the recent growth resurgence is developing countries, especially 
in SSA has been ‘immiserizing’, with growing unemployment, inequality and poverty (Dollar 
and Kraay, 2003; Dollar et al., 2002, 2013; Martinez and Mlachila, 2013; Ola-David and 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2014). Inclusive growth is conceived by the QGI as ‘pro-poor growth’ 
that is socially-friendly, high and durable. Therefore, some relevant dimensions that are 
crucial for growth quality are: increasing productivity, stability, sustainability, strength, better 
standards of living and poverty reduction. As we have highlighted above, the present line of 
inquiry employs the quality of growth measurement from Mlachila et al. (2014) because it has 
incorporated social dimensions to the intrinsic measurement of growth.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data  
We assess a sample of 93 developing countries with cross sectional and panel data for the 
period 1990-2011, consisting of: (i) inclusive growth and control variables from Mlachila et 
al. (2014) and (ii) the political risk indicator from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) to proxy for institutional quality. Following Knack and Keefer (1995) and Acemoglu 
et al. (2001), we refer to the political risk variable as the protection against expropriation 
risks. This index varies from zero to one hundred, with higher values indicating governments 
that are associated with the most effective growth-friendly policies. Data from Mlachila et al. 
consists of four-year non-overlapping intervals, notably: 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 
and 2005-2011. 
As we have highlighted in Section 2, the QGI dependent variable is derived with data 
from a plethora of sources, namely: Sala-i-Martin (2006), United Nations (UN) Commodity 
and Trade (COMTRADE) database, World Development Indicators of the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s World Economic Outlook and Barro and Lee (2010). In 
order to avail more room for more policy implications, the data is further disaggregated into 
income levels, namely: Lower middle income (LMIC), low income (LI) and upper middle 
income (UMIC). The summary statistics is presented in Appendix 1 while the definition and 
sources of the variables are disclosed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 presents the categorisation 
of countries.  
 Selected control variables are consistent with the underlying inclusive growth 
literature, notably: Anand et al. (2013, p. 16), Mlachila et al. (2014) and Asongu (2015a). 
With the exception of inflation, which is expected to reduce ‘growth quality’ at very high 
and/or chaotic rates, due to decreasing purchasing power, other control variables are expected, 
for the most part to display positive signs. Accordingly, high inflation reduces ‘growth 
quality’, while inflation that is stable and low has the opposite effect (Asongu, 2013a). This is 
essentially because stable/low inflation stimulates the much needed investment for economic 
growth, given that high inflation creates substantial uncertainties due to increasing economic 
ambiguity. Accordingly, investors have been documented to prefer economic strategies that 
are less ambiguous (Le Roux and Kelsey, 2015ab). Conversely, the positive effects from 
domestic credit, remittances and foreign direct investment have been documented in the bulk 
of inclusive growth studies (Barro and Lee, 2000; Dollar and Kraay, 2003;  Calderon and 
Servén, 2004; Levine, 2005; IMF, 2007; Hausmann et al., 2007; Mishra, et al., 2011; Anand 
et al., 2012; Seneviratne and  Sun, 2013).  
 We devote some space to substantiating the highlighted literature. In accordance with 
the IMF (2007) and Anand et al. (2013), structural change, human capital and macroeconomic 
stability are important determinants of pro-growth in developing countries. Structural change 
embodies human capital, globalisation (e,g foreign direct investment: FDI) while 
macroeconomic stability entails, among others: fixed investment, technological change and 
educational change. Other macroeconomic and structural characteristics essential for growth 
are stable output volatility and low inflation (Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Barro & Lee, 2010), 
finance (Levine, 2005), infrastructural development (Calderon and Servén, 2004; Seneviratne 
and Sun, 2013); catch-up in value chains (Hausmann et al., 2007; Anand et al., 2012) and 
modernization of production (Mishra et al., 2011).  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) below respectively show cross-sectional and panel specifications.  
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Where: tiQGI ,  
 is the Quality of Growth Index for country i
 
at period t ; is a constant,
 
I  
represents institutional quality in terms of political risk, 
 
W  is the vector of control variables 
(inflation, private domestic credit, remittances and FDI) and ti ,  the error term. While Eq. (1) 
is based on OLS that is consistent with Heteroscedasticity  standard errors, Eq. (2) is 
estimated by 2SLS, in which institutions are instrumented with legal origins from La Porta et 
al. (1999). The first stage of the 2SLS process consists of regressing the institutional variables 
on legal origins (French, English, German and Scandinavian) and then saving the fitted values 
that are subsequently used at the second-stage as the institutional independent variable of 
interest. It is important to note that the cross-sectional data can also be instrumented to have 
some bite on endogeneity.  
 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
 This section presents the empirical results on baseline, ‘time dynamic’ and income 
estimations respectively in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. Table 1 entails both OLS and 2SLS 
estimations in the first-two and last-four specifications respectively. The following can be 
established. First, the information criteria for the validity of models reveal that the adjusted 
coefficients of determination (R² ) and overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests are appealing 
for OLS and 2SLS respectively. Accordingly, in the absence of control variables, institutions 
explain the quality of growth by about 34.6%. Moreover, the null hypotheses for the  Sargan 
and Basmann OIR tests are not overwhelmingly rejected. This implies the legal origin 
instruments are valid and not correlated with the error terms at the second-stage of the 2SLS 
process. Second, the quality of institutions positively affects quality of growth, with the 
magnitude relatively higher for 2SLS. Third, the significant control variables have the 
expected signs. Accordingly, while we expected private domestic credit, FDI and remittances 
to increase growth quality, the effect of inflation is also positive because it is relatively low 
and stable. In essence, the median inflation is about 8%. FDI and private domestic credit are 
essential in stimulating economic growth while remittances which are principally used for 
consumption purposes directly help in mitigating poverty and income inequality (Ssozi and 
Asongu, 2015). We also notice that two of the three time-effects are significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Baseline estimation  
 
qgi qgi qgi qgi_geo qgi qgi_geo 
 
P-OLS P-OLS P-2SLS P-2SLS P-2SLS P-2SLS 
Institutions 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
inflation 
 
0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
credit 
 
0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
remit 
 
0.001 0.003* 0.004* 0.003 0.003 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
fdi 
 
0.004** -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
1990-94 
    
0.116** 0.107** 
     
(0.045) (0.046) 
1995-99 
    
(dropped) (dropped) 
       
2000-04 
    
0.030 0.032 
     
(0.026) (0.026) 
2005-11 
    
0.062** 0.066** 
     
(0.027) (0.027) 
Constant  0.143*** 0.202*** -0.467** -0.503** -0.598** -0.618** 
 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.209) (0.214) (0.251) (0.254) 
Observations 301 260 256 256 256 256 
R
2
 0.346 0.415 0.578 0.589 0.572 0.587 
Sargan (p-value) 
  
0.7682 0.4194 0.5923 0.3105 
Basmann (p-value) 
  
0.7713 0.4252 0.5994 0.3192 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. 2SLS: Two-Stage-Least Squares. qgi: 
Quality of Growth Index.  
 
 Table 2 is based on non-overlapping interval regressions, with the purpose of 
presenting time dynamic evidence of the nexus between institutions and quality of growth. 
Given that estimates corresponding to the independent variable of interest are instrumented, 
interpretation of findings can extend from correlations to causality. In quest for robustness, we 
are poised to complement the main regressions with those from geometric mean-based QGI 
(QGI_GEO). It is important to note that, the main QGI used is computed as an arithmetic 
mean. The following findings are established. First, underlying models are overwhelmingly 
valid because the null hypotheses of the Sargan and Basmann OIR tests for instrument 
validity are not overwhelmingly rejected. Second, institutions are significant determinants of 
quality of growth in the last-three time intervals, namely: 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-
2011. Institutions have significantly contributed to ‘growth quality’ in increasing order during 
the following time intervals, 2005-2011, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. Third, whether the QGI 
employed is based on arithmetic or geometric mean, there is no significant difference in the 
estimate of institutions, in terms of significance and magnitude of significance.  
 
 
  Table 2. Estimations based on time  
 
1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-11 
 
QGI 
Institutions 0.005 0.017** 0.026** 0.016*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) 
Constant 0.241 -0.462 -0.975 -0.402 
 
(0.398) (0.423) (0.585) (0.360) 
Number of observations 51 64 70 71 
R
2
 0.506 0.569 0.460 0.552 
Sargan (p-value) 0.6541 0.8452 0.7459 0.3810 
Basmann (p-value) 0.6767 0.8538 0.7583 0.4030 
 
QGI_GEO 
Institutions 0.001 0.017** 0.026** 0.016*** 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
Constant 0.360 -0.518 -1.049* -0.406 
 
(0.578) (0.461) (0.604) (0.356) 
Number of observations 51 64 70 71 
R
2
 0.321 0.053 0.469 0.029 
Sargan (p-value) 0.6315 0.8611 0.5814 0.4593 
Basmann (p-value) 0.6553 0.8688 0.6001 0.4806 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; The same control variables as in Table 1 are 
employed.  
 
 
 In Table 3, the findings on income-levels broadly confirm the positive nexus between 
institutions and quality of growth established in previous regressions. Unfortunately, while the 
estimate corresponding to UMIC does not have the expected sign, that corresponding to LIC 
is not valid because underlying instruments are not valid. It follows that the positive nexus 
between institutions and ‘growth quality’ is fundamentally driven by lower-middle-income 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3. Estimations based on income levels 
 
LIC LMIC UMIC 
 
QGI 
Institutions 0.018** 0.008*** -0.007 
 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant  -0.605 0.142 1.087*** 
 
(0.440) (0.170) (0.339) 
Number of 
observations 
69 115 72 
R2 0.602 0.111 0.280 
Sargan (p-value) 0.0689 0.1147 0.1163 
Basmann (p-value) 0.0772 0.1223 0.1289 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; The same control variables as in 
Table 1 are employed 
 
QGI_GEO 
 
LIC LMIC UMIC 
Institutions 0.022** 0.008*** -0.006 
 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant  -0.892* 0.117 0.994*** 
 
(0.533) (0.177) (0.336) 
Observations 69 115 72 
R
2
 0.031 0.176 0.349 
Sargan (p-value) 0.0194 0.1162 0.0865 
Basmann (p-value) 0.0209 0.1239 0.0963 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; The same control variables as in 
Table 1 are employed. 
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding implications and future directions  
 
We set-out to complement existing literature by investigating the role of institutions on 
quality of growth. Three main findings have been established. First, institutions are positively 
related to the quality of growth. Second, institutions have significantly contributed to ‘growth 
quality’ in increasing order during the following time intervals: 2005-2011, 1995-1999 and 
2000-2004. Third, the positive nexus between institutions and growth quality is fundamentally 
driven by lower-middle-income countries.  
We devote some space to elucidating why for the 1990-1994 periodic interval; 
institutions do not significantly influence ‘growth quality’. The outcome can be traceable to at 
least two factors, namely: the geopolitical atmosphere of institutional development and 
growth dynamics in developing countries.  First, on the geopolitical institutional front, the 
underlying period reflects a post-Berlin époque during which the Washington Consensus 
policy towards developing countries changed from realpolitik to genuine concerns about 
institutional building (Asongu, 2014b). In essence, before the fall of the Berlin wall, the prime 
motivation of the Washington Consensus was to keep developing countries without the 
influence of the Soviet Union, even at the expense of institutional building (e.g 
democratisation processes). Second, growth resurgence in most developing countries only 
took-up from the mid-1990s (see Fosu, 2015, pp. 44; Alan and Carlyn, 2015, p. 598). Hence, 
given that sustainable growth is a relevant factor in the QGI, it is reasonable to infer that the 
effect of institutions on a periodic interval before the mid 1990s is not significant.  
 It should be recalled that this line of inquiry has been motivated by two main trends, 
notably: (i) increasing immiserizing growth in developing countries and (ii) growing 
expenditure related to violence and political risks, for which 13.4% of Global GDP is being 
spent. The latter justifies the use of political risk as an indicator of institutions by this study. 
Based on our findings, the avoidance of political instability in nations is paramount for the 
achievement of SDGs. This is essentially because a substantial chunk of global GDP used to 
fighting political instability and its negative externalities would be devoted to more human 
and sustainable development objectives.  
As a caveat, whereas we have employed the political risk indicator as an institutional 
variable, the concept of institutions is much broader than has been assumed by Knack and 
Keefer (1995), Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). While the first-two 
have used the political indicator as a proxy for institutional quality, Acemoglu and Johnson 
have employed Polity IV. As pointed-out by Asongu (2014a), in a critic to Ali (2013), the 
above concepts are exclusively limited to political governance. Institutional governance per 
se, is the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them 
(proxied with corruption-control and rule of law).  This caveat evidently leaves room for 
further research, notably: in exploring how other governance indicators collectively and 
individually affect the quality of growth. 
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Appendices 
Appendix1. Descriptives Statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean Std. Dev.        Minimum         Maximum  
qgi 372     0.604    0.140       0.258        0.849 
qgi_geo 372     0.578 0.156        0.002        0.843 
 
Institition 368     80.20217     9.739148        61.2       105.9 
inflation 335     21.579    55.559     -27.133     591.128 
credit 355     36.979     32.500     -54.659     169.251 
govstab 302     9.063     17.971      2.667      318.75 
fdi 366     3.225     4.867    -4.173      62.264 
 
remit 322     4.117     7.391       0.001      63.295 
aid 226     4.921     5.771      -9.546      36.317 
resource 372     0.365    0.482           0           1 
corrupt 301     2.560     0.867           0 5 
Std. Dev: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 2. Data Sources and Definition 
Variables Description Source  
qgi 
Quality of Growth Index. It is a composite (arithmetic mean) index of sub-
indexes capturing the “growth nature” aspect and the “desirable social 
outcomes” aspect 
Authors’ own calculations 
qgi_geo 
Geometric mean-based Quality of Growth Index. It is a composite 
(geometric mean) index of sub-indexes capturing the “growth nature” aspect 
and the “desirable social outcomes” aspect 
Authors’ own calculations 
fragile Dummy variable equaling one if a country is considered as a fragile country  IMF (2011) based on World Bank classification 
resource 
Dummy variable equaling one if a country is considered as a endowed with 
natural resources 
IMF (2012) 
credit Domestic credit offered by banks to private sector, as percent of GDP.  World Development Indicators (WDI) 
inflation Inflation rate, measured as annual change in the CPI index World Development Indicators (WDI) 
bureau 
Quality of the Bureaucracy. Index of the institutional strength and quality of 
the bureaucracy, ranging from 0 to 4. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2009) 
corrupt 
Control of Corruption. Index assessing the control of corruption within the 
political system. It ranges from 0 to 6. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2009) 
govstab 
Government stability. Index ranging from 0 to 12 and measuring the ability 
of government to stay in office and to carry out its declared program(s). 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2009) 
Law 
Rule of Law. Index assessing the strength and the impartiality of the legal 
system, as well as the popular observance of the law. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2009) 
aid Official development Aid actually disbursed, as percent of GDP Guillaumont and Tapsoba (2012) 
fdi 
Foreign direct investment, measured as Net Inflows of Foreign Direct 
Investments, as percent of GDP 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
remit 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees (Percent of GDP), 
calculated as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of employees, 
and migrants' transfers. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
Appendix 3: Categorization of countries  
    
Categories Panels Countries Number 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
Levels  
 
 
 
Low Income 
“Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Central African 
Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Congo Democratic Republic, Zambia”. 
 
 
 
36 
   
 
 
 
 
Middle Income 
“Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Belarus, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, China, Cameroon, Congo 
Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Algeria, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Indonesia, India, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Moldova, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Malaysia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Sudan, El Salvador, 
Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, South Africa”. 
 
 
 
 
57 
   
 
 
Lower Middle 
Income 
“Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, China, Cameroon, 
Congo Republic, Colombia, Djibouti, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Iran, Jordan, 
Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Paraguay, Sudan, El Salvador, 
Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia” 
 
 
35 
   
 
Upper Middle 
Income 
“Argentina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, 
Malaysia, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, South Africa” 
 
22 
    
    
 
 
. 
